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Introduction 
The rules-versus-discretion debate is the most 
enduring, if not the most central, issue in mone- 
tan  policy. It concerns whether moneran poliq 
should be conducted by rules known in advance 
to all or by policymaker discretion. 
For many years, the case for a monetary rule 
was associated with a particular proposal by Mil- 
ton Friedman ( 1959). Building on a tradition 
initiated by  Henn  Simons ( 1936 ), Friedman 
introduced the idea that the effects of  monetan 
policy were uncertain. occurring with long and 
variable lags. In short, he argued that discretion- 
an  management of the money supply in the face 
of such uncertaint). actually amplified economic 
fluctuations. Hence, Friedman argued for a 
constant-money-growth  rule. 
The case for rules has changed fundamentally 
since an important paper by Kydland and Pres- 
cott ( 197).  They show that precommitment to a 
rule could have beneficial effects that discretion- 
an  policies cannot. Unlike Friedman's argument, 
the Kydland-Prescott case was not specific to any 
one view of the world, but could be applied to a 
ven general class of models. In principle, one 
cannot deny that a policy rule can have poten- 
tially stabilizing effects. 
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The example of Kvdland and Prescott, how- 
ever, trivialized an important concern of poliq- 
makers: how to account for uncertainty in the 
link between policy instruments and ultimate 
objectives. Once one allows for uncertainty, 
there is a potential role for flexibiliy to deal with 
variabilin in the links. To the extent that some 
variation is systematic and can be predicted, it is 
possible to incorporate feedback into a rule. 
However, some contingencies cannot be fore- 
seen. When such events are potentially destabil- 
izing, discretion may not be ruled out a priori. 
This suggests that it is reasonable to consider 
the idea of rules with discretion. Fischer (1988) 
has concluded that the dichotomy between rules 
and discretion should be seen as a continuum, 
in which the extent of the monetan authority is 
determined by the immediacy of the link between 
its actions and the attainment of the objectives. 
The actual practice of monetan policy can be 
viewed as a point on the continuum. Moreover, 
the rise of monetan targeting in the 1970s, 
which led to alternative operating procedures 
with differing degrees of commitment, illustrates 
that the degree of commitment to any rule can 
van  over time. Changes in the degree of com- 
mitment are-best understood when one confronts 
the difficulties in making rules operational. 
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of the rules-\.ersus-discretion  debate and exam- 
ines the problems associated m3th  making rules 
operational. Section 1 traces the evolution of rule 
advtxaq  from the time of the Federal Resewe 
Act. Section 11  describes the actual operating 
procedures from the early 1970s to the present. 
The operational problems facing rule advocates 
are highlighted in Section 111, and Section n'  dis- 
cusses how m70  recently proposed rules address 
the operational problems. Section \.:  offers some 
concluding comments. 
I.  Rule Advocacy in the 
United States After 
the  Federal Reserve 
The original Senate bill to create the Federal 
Resenre System in 1913 contained a provision 
that the system should promote a stableprice 
lerd This provision was  stricken by the House 
Committee on Banking and Currenq and was 
not included in the original Federal Resenle Act, 
reflecting the dominant influence of the real bills 
dtxtrine at that time. By the late 1920s. however, 
several bills had been proposed to amend the 
Federal Resenre Act  explicitly to include a provi- 
sion for price stability.'  Advocates of these bills 
essentially sought to legislate a rule establishing 
the primacy of the price-level objective. 
These efforts culminated in the Strong Hear- 
ings, held by rhe House Banking Commirtee in 
1926- 192?.2 The hearings initially considered a 
bill by Representative  James G.  Strong including 
a provision that "all the po)mrers of the Federal 
Resenre  System should be used for promoting a 
stable price level." Specifically. Congressman 
Strong did not want the Federal Rese~e  to have 
the discretion to var?. the price le\rel for the pur- 
suit of  an! other objecti\re. 
While the bill instructed that the Federal 
Reserve's discount-rate poliq  was to be deter- 
mined with "the view of  promoting price stabil- 
it\.." no formula was specified. Thus, there nss  a 
cemin vagueness about how the rule would be 
implemented.3  It left open the role for discre- 
tion in determining how much the discount rate 
should be altered when the price level deviated 
1  For  a thorough revlew of  the debate. see  F~sher  (19341. It should be 
noted here that a povlslon tor  purchas~ng  power  was eventually ~ncwporated 
In the Employment  Act of  1946. However. the pr~ce-stablllty  goal was not 
Included as the p~mary  oblectlve as most advocates of  prlce stabll~ty  In the 
1920s had sought. 
2  For  an excellent d~scwslon  of  the background and events sunoundlng 
the Strong hearings, see  Helzel 11985) 
from its objective. A subsequent version of  thc 
bill was even more ambiguous about the obiec.- 
tive of price stabilin.. Eventually, Congressional 
interest in establishing the primaq of the objec 
tive of price stabiliy faded. 
The Simons Tradition 
In a widely celebrated article of  1936. Henr?. 
Simons initiated a case for rules that n-as to 
become knoun as the Chicago view. Specifically, 
Simons contrasted wo  sharply distinct ways to 
conduct monetan poliq: one, to assign in 
advance specific responsibilities to a monetac 
authority to be carried out in accordance with 
well-defined operational rules; the other, to 
specifi a general goal while allowing the mone- 
tary authority wide discretionary powers to 
achieve the goal. The essential distinction is that 
the first regime defines the authority's objective 
in terms of the means, while the second defines 
the objective in terms of the ends. 
Simons argued for rules in terms of means. 
H& case was  on'liberal ( 17th-centw 
sense) principles. "The liberal creed demands 
organization of our economic life largely 
through individual participation in a game ulitl~ 
definite rules.  It calls upon the state to provide a 
stable framework of rules within which enter- 
prise and competition may effectively control 
and direct the production and distribution of 
goods." ( Simons [ 19361, p. 1  ) 
The essential notion is that goL7ernment  is 
necessan for establishing laws that would define 
the rules for a ''game" in which competitive free 
enterprise could flourish, but that go17ernment 
should not be a player in the game. The idea 
that government would manage the currency to 
manipulate aggregate economic outcomes 
meant that government would be a player and 
thus violated the liberal creed. 
An ideal rule according to Simons would be 
one that fixed the quantin of the money supply. 
He did not believe, however, that such a rule 
could be made operational without radical 
reform of the financial structure. Essentially, he 
beliesed that an unregulated financial sector wa5 
a source of great instability in  money demand. 
This instability was reflected in the perverse 
behavior of velociy which, he argued, necessi- 
tated a role for discretionan actions. Simons 
3  Hetzel (1985) notes lhat Congressmn Strong and hrs supporters 
wanted lo  ~nst~lut~onal~ze  the  policy of  Governor  Strong (no relal~on)  of Ihe 
New Ywk Federal Reserve Bank, wt~lch  they cred~ted  fa  the ms~derable 
plce stablllty that exlsted after 1922. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1988 Q 3
Best available copytherefore suggested a number of ideal reforms to 
reduce the variabilit) of  velwity to  levels condu- 
cive to successful implementation of a fixed- 
money-supply rule. That is, government would 
need to redefine the rules of the game to avoid 
having to manage the money supply. 
One proposed reform was the elimination of 
fractional-reserve banking. By  requiring 100- 
percent reserves on all demand deposits, Simons 
sought to reduce greatly the threat of bank runs 
and the consequent effecrs on hoarding money 
(velocity changes). Such a reform would also 
give the monetan authority direct control over 
the total money supply by making it equivalent 
to the monetary base. 
Simons recognized, however, that fixing the 
supply of deposits might merely serve to 
encourage the creation of effective money substi- 
tutes that would also affect velocity. Thus, 
another "ideal" (but even more radical) reform 
would be to prohibit fixed-money contracts. Re- 
stricting claims to residual equity or common- 
stock form would essentially drive a wedge 
between money and other assets and would 
tend to minimize the variability of velocity. In 
sum, Simons believed that a monetary rule in 
terms of means could be made operational only 
under a highly regulated financial system. 
Simons was not naive about the kind of assent 
that could be gained for such radical reforms in 
modern democratic societies. He thought that 
adoption of an appropriate framework could be 
implemented only afrer decades of "gradual and 
systematic reordering of financial practices." lron- 
ically. liberal principles also seem to support the 
notion that financial institutions should be largely 
unregulated and free to offer any instruments they 
choose. Indeed. institutional reform has moved 
in the opposite direction of Simons's ideal. 
Recognizing the practical difficulties of sharp 
changes in velocity and that his ideal reforms 
might be unattainable. Simons argued for a rule 
for price stabiliv in the interim. Because this is 
a rule of ends rather than means, the opem- 
tional procedures were not well defined. His 
basis for this practical solution was that it was 
the "least illiberal" of the alternatives he consid- 
ered. Thus, he recognized that for immediate 
purposes a certain amount of discretionan lati- 
tude was necessan. W'hile Simons may have 
misjudged society's willingness to adopt his 
ideal reforms (new  rules). his liberal view of 
economic agents participating in a game was 
prescient about the future state of the debate. 
The Simons tradition was subsequently modi- 
fied and popularized by Milton Friedman ( 19i8, 
1959, 1969). Initially, Friedman offered detailed 
proposals much in the spirit of Simons. They 
included the 100-percent reserves reform applied 
to both time and savings deposits at banks. 
Subsequently, however, Friedman changed 
tack, taking the position that the behavior of 
velocity, particularly the veit~ity  of the h12 
aggregate, was not so pemerse in a relative 
sense, even under a fractional-reserve banking 
system. He argued that the discretionan actions 
of the Federal Resene (albeit well-intentioned) 
were likely to be a more pemerse source of 
economic instability. Thus. adherence to a 
constant-money-gronzh  rule n70uld  lead to 
greater economic stabilit) than would a rule 
with feedback, with or without discretion. In 
essence, Friedman maintained the idea that the 
monetary authorin. should not be a player in the 
game, but he eventually rejected the need for 
wholesale reform of the financial system. 
Friedman's case for a constant-grou~h  rule 
was based less on the liberal creed and more on 
pragmatism. His premise was that the economic 
impact of monetan policy occurs with a long 
and variable lag. Feedback, especially of the dis- 
cretionar). type, would have effects at the inap- 
propriate time more often than not. Moreover, 
Friedman argued that political pressures and 
accountability problems under discretion are 
likely to exacerbate the problem. 
While Friedman's case has intuitive appeal, it 
is difficult to justifi in principle. Potentially sta- 
bilizing effects of policy feedback could be ruled 
out a priori only if money were the exclusive 
determinant of nominal GNP in the short run. If 
other identifiable factors also have significant 
explanatory power, then judicious use of feed- 
back can, in principle, reduce the variability of 
nominal GNP, even if the coefficients on lagged 
money are stochastic. On the other hand, the sta- 
bi lizing effects of poliq feedback with parameter 
unceminty are smaller than when parameters 
are nonstoxhastic (see  Bminard  [I9671  X4 
By  e\,entually abandoning 100- percent 
resenes, Friedman also allowed a control prob- 
lem: how to make a constant-growth rule opera- 
tional for measures of inside money. Under 100- 
percent resen7es  there would be virtually no 
distinction between money and monetan base. 
Since Friedman also proposed closing the dis- 
count windou., all money would essentially be 
outside money, and hence directly controlled 
by the Fed. 
M 4  When eflects of  monetary policy occur  w~lh  a lag. there 1s  a potentla1 
fix Instrument rnstabll~ty.  The prospect of dyMrnrc rnstabll~ty  can  be reduced 
wth apyopnale modrf~cat~ons  to the  oblectrve flncllon 
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dropped the idea of 100-percent reserves. how- 
ever, the issue of monetary control became 
relevant. When the measure of money is endo- 
genous, the problem of making a consrant- 
money-growth rule operational is far from triv- 
ial. Such was an important lesson of monetary 
targeting in the early 1980s. Perhaps recognizing 
this fact. advocates for money-grou~h  rules now 
t?*pically  propose closing the discount window 
and adopting a constant-growth rule for the 
monetan base. 
Arguments for a monetat). rule in the Simons 
tradition remain highly controversial in princi- 
ple. One cannot rule out the possibility that an 
intelligent policymaker could effectively take 
account of incomplete information when decid- 
ing optimal monetat). policy. As Barro ( 1985) 
notes, "if the policymaker were also well- 
meaning, then there was no  obvious defense for 
using a rule in order to bind his hands in 
advance." Moreover, Fischer argues, "At a formal 
level Friedman's analysis suffered from the logi- 
cal weakness that discretion seemed to domi- 
nate rules: if a particular rule would stabilize the 
economy, then discretionan policymakers 
could always behave that %lay-and  retain the 
flesibiliy to change the rule as needed.'' 
Kydland and  Prescotl 
The idea that discretion could alwys replicate a 
preferred polic?. rule seemed to provide a highly 
influential argument in which intelligent, well- 
meaning poliqmakers should not be bound by 
rules. However. in a widely recognized paper. 
Kydland and Prescott ( 19")  demonstrate a fal- 
lac  in this argument. It is now well understood 
that if economic outcomes depend on expecta- 
tions about future policies. then credible pre- 
commitment to a rule could have favorable 
effects on the economic outcomes that discre- 
tionan. policies cannot have. 
Applications of the Iiydland and Prescott result 
to monetaA7  poliq  are often developed in famil- 
iar (and highly abstract) niodels of outpur and 
inflati~n.~  These models assume that wage- 
setters and the monetw authorit?.  are engaged 
in a noncooperative game. In this game. wage- 
setters must specify the nominal wage rate in a 
5  The  pan~cular  example presented here  IS  the compact statlc model In 
Fmscher  (19881  Tne use of  a srarrc model  to rllustrate Wmic  mmlstency 
has Ben crltlcmzed as maaequate The &SIC  concept, however, has been devel- 
oped In  IM context of a dynam~c  model  (see Rcberds [I!%]).  Since 11 IS  the 
mcept we want  to convey here,  the slatlc rodel sutf~ces 
contract' (their play) b~yorc.  prices are deter- 
mined (the poliqmaker's play). Firms' decisions 
to hire are made after prices are determined, so 
that the real wage is known. Since firms are 
assumed to be profit maximizers, the real wage 
determines the level of output for the economy. 
An essential feature of the game is that by 
determining the price level, the policymaker's 
play determines the real wage and level of real 
output. Moreover, expectational errors of wage- 
setters determine the deviation of output from 
its full employment levels. Thus, the game 
yields the familiar output supply function 
where j1  and T  are output and inflation, y* is 
full employment output, and re  is the expected 
inflation rate. 
The policymaker is assumed to have a loss 
function quadratic in the deviations of inflation  - 
and output from target levels. Here, desired 
inflation is assumed to be zero. 
(2)  L  =  an
2  +  (JV-  @*)' 
The target rate of output is assumed to be  above 
the natural rate, that is, k > 1. One motivation 
for this assumption is that tax distortions and 
unemployment policy cause the natural rate to 
be too low from a social point of view. Alterna- 
tively, one might argue that the labor market is 
dominated by large unions (see Canzoneri 
[I9851  ). He assumes that the labor supply curve 
includes only union members and that wage- 
setters' behavior systematically excludes other 
workers. By contrast, the loss function includes 
all workers. Others have argued that equation 
(2)  is not really a measure of social utility, but 
reflects the bias of policymakers to underesti- 
mate the natural rate of unemployment. 
To illustrate the advantage of a rule, consider 
the case in which the policymaker has discre- 
tion in a one-period game. Because the policy- 
maker chooses policy after the u~age-setters 
specif?! the uwge rate, the wage-setters know 
that the policymaker has the incentive to take 
the e~pected  in  flation rate as given and to 
induce higher employment with additional 
inflation, if possible. Given the known loss func- 
tion. there is only one strategically rational 
expectation (that is, Nash solution) for inflation: 
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incentive to choose an inflation rate higher than 
expected. The gains from the additional output 
would be more than offset by the loss of  the 
additional inflation. Note also that if  the policy- 
maker had an objecthre for the inflation rate less 
than the expected inflation rate before wage- 
setters acted, it would be inconsistent after- 
liwrd. That a zero-inflation objecti~re  is not cred- 
ible with discretion is an example of the 
problem of  rime inco?zsistenq! 
The value of the loss function e\.aluated at the 
solution is denoted as L, and is given by 
If the policymaker could credibly precommit 
to a policy of zero inflation, that is, a dynami- 
cally consistent inflation objective, the loss func- 
tion would be 
Since Lp < L, , precommitment toa  zero-inflation 
objective affects expectations in a way that leads 
to  a more favorable outcome than pure discretion 
would allow. Essentially, discretion buys nothing 
in terms of output, which is the same under 
both policies. but leads to an inflationar). bias. 
To be sure, the basic result of Kydland and 
Prescott demonstrates in a \?en  precise way a 
benefit to precommitment to a policy rule. 
Although developed in a highly abstract model. 
the result has been widely influential in aca- 
demic research. A major shortcoming of the anal- 
ysis, however, is that it trivializes the control 
problem. Specifically, it presumes that the poliq- 
maker has a deterministic operating procedure 
that enables precise control of  inflation. Once 
disturbances are introduced Into the model, the 
precommitment solution does not necessarily 
dominate the discretion solution. 
To anal>ze  the control problem. Canzoneri 
considers a stochastic disturbance to money 
demand such that velociy fo1lon.s a random 
ndk. In  his game, wage-setters cannot see the 
disturbance at the time they specifi their wage, 
but the Federal Resenfe  has some forecast of 
money demand before it chooses its poliq for 
money growth. If the Fed is left with some flex- 
ibiliy, it can accommodate the predictable 
component of the change in velocit)'. As Can- 
zoneri notes, this practice benefits both wage- 
setters and society as a whole. Thus, the polic~ 
problem becomes one of trading off flexibilin 
needed for stabilization with the constraint 
needed for eliminating the inflation bias.6 
The discussion thus far has been in the con- 
text of a one-period framework. In realin.. hon- 
ever, the central bank has a horizon that emends 
beyond one period. Indeed, this may explain 
why central banks are typically isolated from 
political pressures by design. It is now widely 
understood that in a multiperiod context. the Fed 
may be able to establish a reputation that senes 
the same purpose as a moneran. rule. This possi. 
bilin has been investigated by Barro and Gordon 
( 1983a, 1983b). They find that under certain con- 
ditions, reputation-building can lead to a result 
that is superior to pure discretion, although not 
as good as precommitment to a rule. 
Barro and Gordon assume, however, that nage- 
setters e\rentually have access to the same infor- 
mation as the Fed. Canzoneri shows that when 
the Fed has its own private forecast of money 
demand, it has an incentive to misrepresent its 
intentions?  He further demonstrates that no sta- 
ble resolution of the credibility problem can rely 
on the Fed's own announcement of its forecast. 
When the Barro and Gordon model is modified 
-to  account for asymmetric information, the Fed 
cannot build sufficient credibility by simply run- 
ning a noninflationary policy for a few periods. 
Rogoff (1985) has shown that other solutions 
may mitigate the problem of dynamic inconsis- 
tency. one  such solution is that societ)' can 
benefit by choosing a "consen.ative" central 
banker-one that places a high cost on inflation. 
In the context of the simple model above, this 
means that the central bank places a high value 
on parameter a  in its loss function. Equation (4) 
reveals that as a gets large, the value of the loss 
function diminishes, ultimately approaching the 
value of the precommitment solution given in 
equation (5). 
Like Barro and Gordon, Rogoff assumed sym- 
metric information. When the Fed has private 
information! it has the incentive to appear more 
consenative than it actually is; the wage-setters 
have no way of telling. The implication is that 
there could be periodic inflationary breakdowns 
followed by sustained periods where credibility 
builds and wage-setters learn the true intentions 
of their central bank. Unfortunately, Canzoneri 
shows that it is no simple matter to legislate 
incentive-compatible rules that would remedy 
the problem posed by private information. 
6  F~scher  (1988) demonstrates ~n  a fml  model that when control enw 
exlsts. the  orderlng of  the loss funct~ons  under pcecwnmltment and  dlscretlon 
IS  amb~guous. 
8 7  If  the money demand fwecast  were  predicated on  a stable rodel over 
sme. It would be preferable for  the  Fed to commlt to a contingent rule based 
on  that  model forecast  Thus,  wh~le  the rule would allow flex~bll~ly.  11 would 
rot adm~t  d~saet~on.  G~ven  the absence of  ev~dence  of  stab~llty  ~n  money 
demand,  such a rule seem ~nleas~bk 
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conditions, intermediate targeting may also pro 
vide a reasonable solution to the problem of 
dynamic inconsistent). By  providing the central 
bank with incentives to hit an intermediate 
target, it is possible to induce fewer inflationan 
wge  bargains in the conten of his model. While 
the Rogoff result demonstrates some a priori 
basis for intermediate targeting, his analysis 
abstracts from many problems the poliqmaker 
faces in practice. Nevertheless, the literature 
since 1977 suggests there is a reasonable basis 
for some precommitment-if  not to a rule for all 
time-to some moneta?  policy on a continuum 
between a pure rule and pure discretion. 
II.  The Opentin! 
Strategy of the 
hdenl  Reserve 
The opemting strategy of the Federal Reserve can 
be viewed as a commitment to a poliq on the 
continuum benreen a pure rule and pure discre- 
tion. The rule-like elements are embedded in 
the Fed's monetary targeting procedure. Mone- 
tar). targets are not ends in themselves, but are 
intermediate variables ben~een  the instrument 
variables that the Fed directly controls, such as 
the federal funds rate or nonborrowed resenes, 
and ultimate goals. such as price stabilin and 
stable output growth. Thus, intermediate target 
variables must be closely linked to both ultimate 
objectives and instruments. 
The use of intermediate targets has been 
criticized as redundant and inefficient from a 
control-theoretic perspective ( see B. Friedman 
[19'5]  ). These objections, however. are based 
on the assumption that polic~n~akers  have pre- 
cise. reliable kno-wledge about the relationships 
bemeen instruments and final objectives. In 
practice, poliqmakers see great uncertainty in 
these links and doubt that such relationships 
could be captured by econonletric models accu- 
rately enough to be operationally useful (see 
Black  [ 198'1  ). In  contrast, intermediate target 
~yariables  are seen as relatively more controllable 
than ultimate variables. 
hloreover, polic?  decisions are made by major- 
in- rule. It is therefore difficult. if not ~mpossible 
(mow's  theorem) to obtain a consensus for 
adopting a particular social objective function, 
which is necessan under direct targeting of final 
objectives. Under an intermediate targeting strat- 
eg,  the Fed does not need to specie. numerical 
objectives for goal variables. 
Intermediate urgeting strategies can van. sub- 
stantially in degree of flexibiliy or commitment. 
In principle, intermediate targets may or ma!.  not 
be designed to allow feedback. For example, a 
target could be specified for a fi\.e-!.ear  horizon 
n~ithout  allowing for revisions, or for a three- 
month horizon to accommodate frequent 
adjustments based on new information. Also. the 
operating procedure used to contn)l the target 
variable may or may not allow for a high degree 
of discretion. Thus, operating rules could be 
highly automatic with infrequent discretionan 
input or be judgmentally modified dayto-day. 
based on the latest information. 
Actual practice of monetary targeting indicates 
that the degree of flexibility and discretion 
incorporated into the strategy is influenced by 
tnro  key factors. The first is evidence concerning 
the stability of the relationship on which the strat- 
egy is based. If  there is a broad consensus about 
the reliability of the relationship between the 
intermediate target and ultimate goals, then it is 
more likely that a central bank would be willing 
to commit to closer targeting of the tariable with 
less feedback from other sources, whether dis- 
cretionary or not. The other key factor is the cen- 
tral bank's credibilin or reputation in containing 
inflationan expectations. If  the central bank 
establishes its credibility by a~~oiding  inflationary 
policies, then the public and Congress are gen- 
erally more willing to accept a greater degree of 
discretion in strategy and tactics. 
The interplay of these factors may well 
account for the increased reliance on monetary 
aggregates as intermediate targets during the 
early 1970s. Before the mid-  196Os, there %.as 
scant evidence that discretion exercised by the 
Federal Resenre provided a substantive basis for 
inflationan. expectations. Nominal interest rates 
were, on avenge, too low to indicate expecta- 
tions of rising inflation. The public apparently 
believed that the Fed would "take the punch- 
bowl away just as the pam  got going,"  a percep- 
tion consistent with Rogoffs notion of a conser- 
vative central bank. Although the Federal Reserve 
had intermediate targets for interest rates-a strat- 
e@,  that is now widely viewed as potentially 
defective for avoiding inflation-the Fed seemed 
to use its discretion judiciously in avoiding infla- 
tion and hence in assuaging public doubt about 
the efficacy of its opemting strateg).. 
By  the early 1970s, however, a basis for doubt 
was beginning to emerge, as inflation had 
accelerated to new and persistently high levels. 
Over that decade the Fed gradually strengthened 
its reliance on monetary aggregates as a source 
of  information about its ultimate objectives. 
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Fed began to announce publicly its desired 
annual growth mnges for selected monetan 
aggregates in response to a Congressional reso- 
lution in  1975. Evidence in the early 1970s con- 
vinced many that the relationship between 
money and nominal GNP-as  summarized by 
velocin-was  sufficiently reliable to choose 
monetary targets over annual, or even longer, 
horizons. Also, the parallel rise in the price level 
offered simple but persuasive evidence that infla- 
tion could be slowed by slowing growth of the 
monetary aggregates. In 1979, the Fed adopted a 
strategy for disinflation by gradually reducing 
the rate of money growth from year to year. 
The strategy was coupled with an automatic 
feedback rule to enhance monetary control and 
demonstrate a commitment to the strategy. Over 
most of the 1970s,  the Fed used the federal 
funds rate-the interest rate banks charge one 
another on overnight loans of resenres-as  its 
operating target for controlling money growth. 
Specifically, it sought to influence the quantity 
of money the public demanded by altering the 
opportunity cost of money. For example, if 
money grouzh was too rapid, it attempted to 
raise the federal funds rate, and thereby raise 
other short-term rates. 
The higher rates were expected to slow 
money grom~h  by inducing the public to shift 
from monetan assets to other financial assets. 
Over longer horizons, higher interest rates 
might also be expected to slow spending 
growth and hence the transactions demand for 
money. In practice, however, there is always 
substantial pressure for the Fed to minimize 
interest-rate movements, particularly interest- 
rate increases. For this reason and others. the 
Federal ResenJe  did not respond sufficiently 
promptly or intensively to keep monetan 
growth from accelerating in the 1770s. 
By  late 1979, the inflation ratehad accelerated 
to double-digit levels. Financial markets, espe- 
cially foreign markets, began reacting strongly to 
the inflationan developments. The dollar was 
falling rapidly as foreign investors appeared to 
doubt the Fed's resolve to contain inflation. In 
response to the e~~ident  inflationan pressures, 
the Federal Reserve adopted a new set of tactics 
"as a sign of its commitment to longer-run re- 
straint on money grou~h"  (Lindsey (19~],  p. 
12).  These tactics in effect eliminated a substan- 
tial degree of discretion that the Fed had used to 
smooth short-term interest-rate movements. 
The new procedures sought to control money 
growth by maintaining a short-run target path for 
nonborrowed resenres. As Lindsey describes, 
"holding to a nonborrowed reserves path essen- 
tially introduces in the short run an upward slop. 
ing money supply curve on interest rate and 
money space" (p. 12). In effect, the nonborrow- 
ed resewes target created an autonlatic self- 
correcting mechanism that would panially resist 
all deviations of money from target. If  money 
growth in a given week moved above target. the 
prespecified level of nonborrowed resen-es vir- 
tually assured that the federal funds rate would 
move upward. In sum, the Federal Resewe gave 
up its discretion to minimize federal funds rate 
movements to assure financial markets of its 
commitment to the disinflation strateg. 
While the new procedure involved substantial 
commitment at the tactics level, it permitted sig- 
nificant discretionary feedback at the strateg 
level. Under the strategy, the FOMC was free to 
change its short-term monetary target to take 
account of new information-a practice that led 
to significant deviations of money from 
announced annual targets. Such discretionan 
feedback was deemed necessan as evidence 
mounted that the velocity of money was not as 
reliable as expected.  .  . 
It was well understood at the time ihat dereg. 
ulation in financial markets, changes in transac- 
tions technology, and disinflation were having a 
substantial impact on individual portfolios and 
hence on the veloci y of money. While such fac- 
tors could account for the target misses in a qual- 
itative sense, policymakers lacked means to pre- 
dict the impact on money grou~h  in order to 
specib reliable target values. By  August 1783 the 
evidence was compelling that the behavior of 
velociy had been altered in some permanent 
way. Because time was needed to identify the 
new patterns of velocity behavior, attempts to  con- 
trol monetan aggregates closely appeared futile. 
Consequently, the Fed abandoned its operat- 
ing procedure and hence its commitment to a 
fixed path of nonborrowed resenres  in the short 
run. It de-emphasized the role of Ml and 
adopted a more flexible operating strategy. 
Since the fall of 1983, the Fed's operating target 
has been the aggregate level of seasonal plus 
adjustment borrowings at the discount window. 
Under this procedure, the FOMC specifies a 
short-term objective for this variable at each of 
its regularly scheduled meetings (at approxi- 
mately five- to six-week intewals). 
Unlike with the nonborrowed reserves oper- 
ating target, the current procedure does not 
produce automatic self-correcting federal funds 
rate responses to resist divergences of money 
from its long-run path. Substantial changes in 
the federal funds rate are largely a consequence 
of judgmental adjustments to the borrowings 
target. Thus, the Fed has regained much of the 
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changes that it had prior to 1979. 
It is important to note that by the end of 1982 
the disinflation process had become credible to 
most of the public. Financial markets, panicu- 
larly those for fixed-income securities, reacted 
favorably to the procedural change. Long-term 
interest rates continued to decline substantially 
after the Fed announced abandonment of the 
nonborroured-resewes  procedure. Moreover, 
over the long term, wage demands moderated 
to pre- 1970s levels and have been persistently 
moderate to this day.8 Such would seem strong 
evidence that wage-setters haven't suspected the 
Fed of "cheating" on its goal of reducing and 
maintaining lower inflation. 
The evolutionary cycle of the Federal Reserve's 
operating procedure provides a useful illustration 
of how the degree of discretion has varied in 
response both to evidence concerning the reli- 
ability of the money-income relationship and to 
the reputation of the Fed. As the Fed's credibil- 
ity on inflation appeared to wane in the 1970s it 
adopted procedures that increased reliance on 
monetay aggregates as intermediate targets and 
limited its discretion to smooth interest rates. As 
evidence suggested a breakdown in the behavior 
of velocjty, the degree of commitment to mone- 
tar). control diminished to allow the necessan 
operational flexibility. By  that time the Fed's 
commitment to maintaining lower rates of infla- 
tion had become credible. W'hile the actual strat- 
egy can be  characterized as a monetan rule with 
vaning degrees of discretion, it never incorpo- 
rated the degree of commitment that most 
monetarists had hoped for-one that would 
have not altered moneran targets at all. 
Ill.  Problems  with 
Making Rules Operational 
The revieuv  of the Federal Resen7e's  actual oper. 
ating strates  also sewes to highlight a number 
of  potential problems with making rules opera- 
tional. Poole ( 1988), a longtime monetq  rule 
advocate, recently concludes that "there is a 
serious and probably insurmountable problem 
to designing a predetermined money gron~h 
path to reduce inflation."  Essentially, he argues 
that it is not possible to reliably quantify the 
effects of disinflation on money demand and, 
hence, on ~elocin.~  Thus, managed money is 
8  Fw evldence cmcernlng moderallon In cornpensalron demands, see 
Groshen (1988) 
9  The  polnl IS an example of  a more  vneral result of  Lucas  (19763. 
whlch IS  olscussed below. 
unavoidable during the transition to lower infla. 
tion. While Poole accepts the eventual eficac~  of 
a constant-gron~h  rule, he believes there is no 
formula to determine when the discretionan 
mode should terminate. Presumably, it would 
only be after inflation has been eliminated. 
Even if the transition to lower inflation were 
no longer operationally relevant, the esperience 
of the early 1980s makes it clear that money 
demand and velocity have also been independ. 
ently affected by regularon change and by devel. 
opments in transactions techno lo^. McGIlum 
(1987) has recently argued that a rule should not 
rely on the presumed absence of the,  effects of 
such changes. This principle of rule design pre- 
cludes simple. fvred rules like the constant 
growth rate of money (or monetan base). Oper- 
ational feasibility demands that a monetan rule 
should at least be flexible enough to accommo- 
date the effects of such changes on velocit).. 
Recognizing a need for some form of flexibil- 
ity, some pure-rule advocates now propose non- 
discretionary feedback rules. Nondiscretionary 
' feedback requires specification of a formula link- 
ing goal (or  target) variables to policy instru- 
ments. The formula presumes the existence of 
some reasonably stable and hence reliable model, 
that is, one that characterizes sufficiently well the 
relationship bemeen instruments and objectives. 
The absence of a consensus in macroeconom- 
ics about an appropriate model poses a serious 
obstacle for gaining assent for any particular 
feedback rule in practice. While most economists 
adopt a  perspective, feur  seem willing to accept 
the notion that a particular (especially simple) 
characterization of the economy would be suffi- 
ciently reliable for long periods. Even among 
rule advocates sharing a common perspective, 
there are likely to be subtle differences about the 
formula specification that may splinter support 
for a given rule. 
This problem of  model uncertainty is com- 
pounded by the important demonstration by 
Lucas  ( 1976) that "structural" models are in gen- 
eral not invariant to the way in which policy is 
implemented. Since this critique, there has been 
no widely accepted means of evaluating opera- 
tionally concrete poliq proposals.'O  While many 
large-scale econometric models have met the 
market test, few economists seem convinced by 
poliq e\*aluations  based on particular economet- 
ric models. 
10  Advmtes of  fules somet~rnes  argue that lf a nond~sael~cmary  rule 
were to be ~mplemented,  relalionsh~ps  wwld slab~l~ze,  leadlng lo more favota- 
ble oulcms than qesled  by slrnulallms based on histotlcal relaBonships. 
mile  this plrely a pim  theaetlcal argument  is C~SStefll.  11 does no1 appear 
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ic?  affects aggregate economic outcomes, it is 
not compelling to argue that expectations of 
economic agents ( for example, wage-setters) are 
based on any one mtxlel of the economy. Any 
gi\.en rule could possibl), be perceh7ed  as unsus- 
tainable by a sufficient number of agents such 
that the rule would not be credible in an aggre- 
gate sense. If agents believed the rule nas unsus- 
tainable, the game between agents and poliq- 
makers would become extremely complicated, 
with no apparent solution. Thus, it would not be 
clear that commitment to a rule would be bene- 
ficial. It n70uld  seem useful that a rule advocate 
demonstrate that favorable consequences of a 
proposed rule would be robust to alternative 
models of the economy. 
IV.  Two Recently 
Proposed Rules 
Two recently proposed rules by McCallum (  1987, 
1988) and Hall ( 1984) iliustrate hour the debate 
tnrer  rules versus discretion has evolved to a 
more operationally concrete level. Both authors 
appeal to the result of Kydland and Prescott as a 
justification for implementing their rules. Both 
also recognize a need for flexibiliy and address 
operational problems. In sharp contrast, how- 
ever, is the way they incorporate flexibility. 
McCallum proposes a nondiscretionary feed- 
back rule for nominal income using the mone- 
tan base as the instrument. The target path of 
nominal income is fixed and grows at a pre- 
specified rate of  3 percent per year. The feed- 
back formula is 
where b, =  log of  monetan base ( for period t 1. 
r*, =  log of  base velwiy, s,  =  log of nominal 
GNP, and s:  =  target path for nominal income. 
The constant term 0.00'39  is simply a 3 per- 
cent annual gronth rate translated into quarterly 
logarithmic units. The second term subtracts the 
average grouth rate of \.eltxiy, approximated by 
the average difference in the logarithm of velocity 
over the previous four years. This term can be 
thought of as a simple time-series estimate of 
trend veltx-iy gronth. The third term specifies 
how polic~  is to respond to deviations of nomi- 
nal income from its target path. 
The,moving average of  velociy grouth is a 
simple statistical filter designed to detect per- 
manent changes in velocity grouth. As such, it 
provides a mechanism to maintain a long-term 
correspondence bemreen the current base 
gronth path and the long-term nom~nal  oblec- 
tive to account for changes in tr~nsactions  tech- 
nolog?.. Given the length of the moving-avenge 
period (four years ) and the absence of any ys- 
tematic feedback from interest rates, howewr. 
the rule provides vinually no adiustment in 
response to the current state of the business 
c~cle  or to financial conditions.'! 
The third term provides feedback to  assure that 
nonlinal income ultimately returns to its trend 
path. The choice of pxameter A  incorporates 
some degree of flesibili~  to deal with the poten- 
tial problem of  instrument instabilin. This prob- 
lem arises when effects of polic~  occur over time 
as they do in actual econon~ies.  particularly those 
with sticl\~  prices. large responses to maintain a 
target path in the near term could lead to longer- 
term effects in the opposite direction, requiring 
even greater offsetting policy responses in later 
periods. This sequence would be unstable if 
responses and effects were to become eL7er  in- 
creasing. The \.slue of  A (presumably less than 
zero) should be chosen to minimize the poten- 
tial for this dynamic instabiliv, under the con- 
straint that it be sufficiently large to provide ade- 
quate responsiveness of base growth to target 
misses. h.lcCallum suggests that a value of 0.25 
appears to be somewhat robust for this objective 
over alternative mmtxlels of the economy. 
If  velocity growth were constant, and if  nomi- 
nal GNP were on its target path for a sustained 
period, the poliq prescribed by McCallum's rule 
would be the same as a 3 percent grou~h  rule 
for the monetan base. Thus. McCallum's rule is 
essentially a generalization of the constant- 
money-growth rule. Because it is more general, 
it allom~s  for flexibiliy to deal with some of the 
problems of making monetarist rules operational. 
hloreover. McCallum claims that because the 
monetan base is "controllable." the rule can be 
accomplished with no operational discretion.'Z 
8  11  Recent  evidence suggests that veloc~ty  has become ~ncreas~ngly 
~nrerest-sensltlve  In the  19805  To  the extent that  systematic effects of  Inter- 
est  rates could be  rel~ably  est~mated.  add~tlwlal  flex~bll~ty  could be  ~ntroduced 
Into the rule as feedback to compensate for  shwl-run vanab~l~ty  In velac~ty 
McCallum expresses doubt  however  thal ecmm~sts  know enough to base 
pol~cy  on any one short-run emp~r~cal  model  In this sense he  defends. 11 only 
~nd~reclly  the rnonetarlst d~ctum  of  Fr~edman  In whlch monetary pol~cy  affects 
the economy w~th  long and var~able  lags 
8 12  Under  cment ~nst~tut~mal  arrangements. the  total monetary base can 
be controlled only ~nd~rectly,  wwk~ng  through effects of  changes In Interest 
rates on the demand for base cwnponents  Advocates of base  target~ng  often 
call for  ~nst~tutlonal  reforms-such as exactly conternpwanews reserve 
accwntlng and closure of  the d~scounl  wlndow-to  enable d~rect  control of 
the base  Altemat~vely.  McCallum's mle can be applied to  the mborrowed 
base. vhch IS  d~rectty  controllable under exlstlng ~nst~tut~ons 
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\.ersion of  a rule for means. Tllc flesibilin is 
ex~ren~el!.  limited. I-rowever, involving only feed- 
back from simple statistical nlodels to maintain 
long-run relationships. No  role is given to struc- 
tural models that might allow feedback for short- 
term econon~ic  stabilization. Such a rule shows 
little faith in  macroeconolnic mtdels or in dis- 
cretionan decisions of the Fed. 
Some rule ad\,txates, on the other hand, pro- 
pose 3 much greater role for economic mtdels 
ant1 judgment of the Fed. An example is an ends 
oriented rule advanced by Hall  ( 19%). Under 
Hall's straten, the Federal Resen,e is instructed 
to stabilize the price level around a constant 
long-run a\-erage  t7alue.  To make this strategy 
elastic in the short run, Hall proposes giving the 
Fed some prespecified leeway in achieving the 
target depending on the amount of unemploy- 
ment. The per~nissible  de\.iation of the actual 
price level, p,  from its target, p*,  is defined by 
the simple numerical rule linking it to the de\.ia- 
tion of the unemployment rate, u, from its nor- 
mal rate, presumed to be 6 percent: 
The coefficient A  is to be specified by the Fed- 
eral Resene. Based on simulations. Hall tenta- 
ti~.ely  recommends that it equal eight. 
Specifically. this relationship is to be imposed 
as a constraint on poliq instrument settings. In 
formal terms: "Monetan poliq is on track when 
the deviation of the price level from its constant 
rarget is eight times the deviation of unemploy- 
ment times its normal level  [pr~szslr~~zeci  to be 6 
pcwellt].  Policy is too tight if the price deviation 
is less than eight times the employment devia- 
tion: it is too espansionan when the price devia- 
tion is more than eight times the ernplo!.ment 
deliation. The elasticin, of 8 in  this statement is a 
matter for polic~makers  to choose."  ( Ha11 
1198-11,  p. 140) 
Policy forn~ulation  under this approach would 
be prospective. Thus. the Fed would need to 
employ a model that links instrument variables 
to the price level and to the unemployment rate 
oxer the criterion period.'3  It would be free to 
use whatever model and instruments it chooses. 
Instrument settings would be determined by an 
iterative prtxess. To begin, an initial forecast for 
the unemployment rate and price level would be 
compared against the rule formula to be judged 
for appropriateness-for example, too tight, too 
13  Based on the  assumotlwl that monetary policy affects the unemploy- 
ment rate rebabty only atter a yeanong lag. Hall argues that  the cntenwl 
per~od  should be  the  twecast hor~zon  Iw me  year  beglnn~ng  SIX  months ahead 
eag.. or on track. This process n.ould tl-rerch!. 
determine the direction in nphic.h  instrument scr. 
tings should be changed. if necessan.. A sec.o~-rcl 
round of forecasts would then be obtained and 
compared. The process would continue until the 
instrument settings yielded price-level and 
unemployment forecasts consistent with the rule. 
To impose discipline, Hall would require the 
Fed to be explicit about its forecasts. defending 
them publicly at the semiannual Congressional 
review and in comparison with private forecasts. 
Hall argues that forecasting errors of gtmd pri- 
vate forecasters would provide a sufficiently 
reliable standard to maintain unbiased out- 
comes. If  the Fed's forecasts were consistentl!. 
different from reputable private forecasts. and if 
the outside forecasts were more often correct. 
then the Fed would be under public pressure to 
modify its way of setting policy instruments. For 
Hall, the problem with discretion lies not with 
the use of faulty econometric models but with 
the absence of a commitment to  an explicit rule 
for the price level. 
Both Hall and McCallum employ small empir- 
ical models to generate simulations under their 
rules. McCallum uses a variety of models based 
on competing views to examine the robustness 
of his rule's performance. His simulations sug- 
gest that his rule nrould have produced a root 
mean square error ( RhlSE) of nominal income 
of around 2 percent from 195  to 1985. This is 
approximately one-third the W4SE of actual GNP 
around its trend over the same period. He con- 
cludes that his rule would have worked rela- 
tively well in the United States. 
To address the criticism that his simulations 
are subject to the Lucas critique, McCallum notes 
that his rule relates nominal demand to nominaI 
policy instruments. He argues that the sensitivity 
of parameters to policy regime changes is likely 
to be quantitatively less important for such rules 
than for rules that relate real to nominal varia- 
bles, for example, based-on Phillips curve mod- 
els. Hall's simulations, on the other hand, are 
based on the presumption that there is a relia- 
ble (polic)' invariant) relationship between the 
~nariabifi(~l  of the inflation rate and the variabil- 
i(llof the price level.I4 His simulation results 
suggest that botl. price level variabilir). and 
unemployment variability would have been less 
than actually experienced from 1952 to 1983 
under the elastic-price rule. 
14  The  a~lys~s  of  pohcy In terms of  the  vanabfl~ty  ol unemployment 
and pnce level was developed by  Taylw (1980, 19811.  It  IS  Important to note 
that there  IS  no  lmplred trade-off ln this model between the  lnflatlon rate and 
rend output growth. 
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appear favorable, few analysts seem convinced 
by small-model simulations. Experience with 
large-scale econometric models, for example, 
suggests that interest rates would vaty sharply 
under McCallum's rule. His models, which do 
not allow for interest-rate interactions, cannot 
account for the economic consequences of such 
interest-rate variation. Fischer (1988) argues that 
the natural vehicles for studying policy rules are 
the large-scale econometric models, many of 
which have met the market test. Nevertheless, 
he notes that it would be difficult to justib legis- 
lating any nondiscretionar). rule given the vari- 
ety and inadequacies of existing models. On the 
other hand, existing models may be no more 
reliable for discretionary decisions, particularly 
when policymakers may use them selectively to 
support their own prior beliefs. 
V.  Some  Concluding 
Comment8 
.  . 
The succkss of the U.S. disinflation strategy eady 
in this decade helped reestablish the Federal 
Resenre's credibility as an inflation fighter. Much 
of the reputational capital surely persists today. 
Recently, however, some analysts have questioned 
whether the current strategy is adequate to 
extend and maintain the progress against infla- 
tion (see Black  [ 19871 1. 
A key concern is that the strategy may lack suf- 
ficient institutional discipline to assure that 
short-term objectives-such as interest-rate 
smoothing-do nor interfere with the achieve- 
ment of longer-term price stabilin. This fear has 
led to a renewed interest in a1ternatix.e strategies 
that are closer to a pure rule on the continuum 
between a pure rule and pure discretion. 
Ideally, a poliq strateg. should perform ade- 
quately well under alternative ipieuls  about 
aggregate economic relationships so that sufi- 
cient numbers of agents believe that the rule 
could be credibly implemented. Rule advocates 
might well follow the example of McCallum and 
examine the robustness of their rule's perfor- 
mance, simulating with alternative models of the 
economy. The choice of criteria for "adequate 
performance" is of course a difficult and contro- 
versial maner. We conclude here, as does Fischer 
(1988), that the discussion of alternative policies 
is too important to be suppressed by the econ- 
ometric evaluation critique. 
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